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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Richard Wagner appeals, contending that the district court erred when it 
summarily dismissed his petition for post conviction relief. Specifically, he asserts that 
he raised a genuine issue of material fact that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary due to his counsel's erroneous advice. He contends on appeal that the 
district court erroneously dismissed his petition after making a credibility determination 
in regard to that genuine issue of material fact. As such, the district court erred by 
summarily dismissing the petition, and this Court should reverse the order summarily 
dismissing the petition, vacate the judgment in this case, and remand the case for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In the underlying criminal case, Mr. Wagner pied guilty, pursuant to a plea 
agreement, to one count of lewd conduct, and in exchange, the State dismissed two 
other counts, as well as the Information Part II alleging a prior sexually-based 
conviction, and the State also agreed to recommend a unified sentence of thirty years, 
with ten years fixed. (R., p.65; Supp. R., pp.77-79; Supp. Tr., p.4, Ls.12-20.)1 Prior to 
1 The district court took judicial notice of "the entire underlying criminal file" from the 
underlying criminal case. (R., p.52.) That documents from that file were provided in 
independently bound and paginated volumes. To avoid confusion, reference to the 
record or transcripts from that file will be identified as "Supp." Additionally, the 
transcripts from hearings in the post conviction case are contained in two independently 
bound and paginated volumes. To avoid confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume 
containing the transcript of the Status Conference held on June 17, 2013. "Vol.2" will 
refer to the volume containing the transcript of the hearing on the State's motion for 
summary dismissal held on July 17, 2013. 
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the entry of this plea, the had filed a motion to introduce evidence of Mr. Wagner's 
previous conviction as evidence of a common plan or scheme pursuant to I.R. 404(b) 
at trial. (Supp. R., pp.56-60.) The district court ultimately imposed a unified sentence of 
thirty years, with only eight years fixed. (R., p.66.) Mr. Wagner did not appeal from the 
judgment of conviction. (R., p.5.) 
However, Mr. Wagner did file a timely pro se petition for post conviction relief, 
alleging, inter alia, that his trial counsel had "failed to argue to keep his prior record out 
of court records." (R., pp.5-6.) The district court appointed counsel, who clarified that 
this was a claim alleging that Mr. Wagner's guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary because trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(R., p.57.) Specifically, counsel clarified that the ineffective assistance complained of 
constituted trial counsel inaccurately telling Mr. Wagner that he would lose at trial 
because of his prior record, and also that, if he went to trial, he would be sentenced to 
life in prison, and so, based on those assertions by counsel, Mr. Wagner pied guilty 
despite believing in his factual innocence. (Tr., Vol.1, P.6, L.15 - p.7, L.20; R., pp.73-
74.) In a subsequent affidavit,2 Mr. Wagner also alleged that counsel had told him 
that, if he did not answer the questions in the plea colloquy and on the guilty plea 
questionnaire "correctly," the district court would not accept his guilty plea, although he 
did note that his trial attorney did not advise him to lie in his responses. (R., p.74.) 
The State filed an answer denying Mr. Wagner's allegations. (R., pp.26-28.) It 
also moved for summary dismissal of this claim because "[t]he defendant's prior criminal 
2 This affidavit was filed after the district court issued its notice of intent to summarily 
dismiss the petition. (R., pp.65-72 (the notice of intent to summarily dismiss); R., pp73-
74 (Mr. Wagner's subsequent affidavit).) 
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history is always relevant at sentencing and it is not for counsel of record to try and 
'keep it out."' (R., pp.34-35.) The district court held a hearing on the State's motion 
after counsel had been appointed, and the State did not add any other arguments in 
regard to the allegation about Mr. Wagner's prior record. (See Tr. Vol.2, p.3, Ls.2-7.) 
The district court took the arguments under advisement, and subsequently, filed a 
notice of intent to summarily dismiss the petition. (Tr., Vol.2, p.9, L.20; R., pp.65-72.) 
The district court decided that summary dismissal was appropriate because the 
answers Mr. Wagner gave during the plea colloquy and in the guilty plea questionnaire 
were evidence which disproved his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(R., pp.69-70.) The district court stated, "[s]ince this Court is the trier of fact, it is not 
constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary 
disposition; rather, it is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from 
uncontroverted evidence." (R., p.71.) Based on this reasoning, it considered 
Mr. Wagner's claims in light of his answers in the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire. 
(R., pp.69-70.) For example, "[h]is assertion now that he was 'factually innocent' is 
directly contradicted by the record." (R., p.70.) In making those considerations, the 
district court essentially weighed the evidence presented in Mr. Wagner's affidavit 
against the evidence presented in the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire, and made 
a credibility determination in favor of Mr. Wagner's statements in the plea colloquy. 
(See R., pp.69-71.) The district court also determined that Mr. Wagner had not 
presented a valid claim for relief in regard to counsel's advice about his prior record 
because "it is neither a trial counsel's obligation nor counsel's responsibility to hide a 
prior record from a sentencing court." (R., p.69.) 
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As a result of its conclusions in that regard, summarily dismissed Mr. Wagner's 
petition because it was based on "bare and conclusory statements that were addressed 
in the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss. The petitioner has failed to introduce any new 
evidence to support his allegations." (R., pp.76-77; R., p.86.) Mr. Wagner timely 
appealed from that decision. (R., pp. 78-79.) 
4 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Wagner's petition for post 
conviction relief even though he presented evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue 
of material fact. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing Mr. Wagner's Petition For Post 
Conviction Relief Even Though He Presented Evidence Sufficient To Raise A Genuine 
Issue Of Material Fact 
Post-conviction cases are civil in nature. Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 
(2008). In post-conviction cases, a petition may be summarily dismissed only if it does 
not present a genuine issue of material fact. Id.; see I.C. § 19-4906(b). In determining 
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, "[a] court is required to accept the 
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true . . . ."3 Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; 
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321 (1995). Additionally, during the summary 
judgment phase, the courts "liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in 
favor of the non-moving party."4 Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 881 (Ct. App. 2008); 
see also Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004) ("[l]nferences [are] liberally 
construed in favor of the petitioner."). When a genuine issue of material fact exists and 
would, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, entitle the petitioner for relief, the district court 
must conduct an evidentiary hearing. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; Berg v. State, 131 
Idaho 517,518 (1998). 
To show a genuine issue of material fact in regard to a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the petitioner must allege facts which demonstrate that counsel's 
3 Where, as in this case, the State files an answer that denies the allegations in the 
verified petition (R., pp.26-28), those denials do not affirmatively disprove the 
allegations. Rather, they only create genuine issues of material fact in regard to those 
issues, specifically, whether or not the petitioner's allegations are factually accurate. 
Because a genuine issue of material fact exists in such cases, summary dismissal is 
inappropriate. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. 
4 In this case, the State is the moving party. (R., pp.29-36.) Therefore, the facts and 
reasonable inferences are liberally construed in Mr. Wagner's favor. Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 792; Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 881. 
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performance fell below a reasonable standard and that the petitioner was prejudiced by 
that deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984 ); 
McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850 (2004). In regard to the second prong of the 
Strickland test, a petitioner shows prejudice when he demonstrates that there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, or, in other words, 
he must undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; 
McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570 (2010). In cases where, as here, the petitioner 
alleges ineffective assistance relating to his decision to accept a plea offer, he must 
show '"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."' Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 
612, 621 (2011) (quoting Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2010) (quoting 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985))). 
Furthermore, in order to be a valid guilty plea, the plea must be made knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily. I.C.R. 11; see, e.g., State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97 
(2007) ("Manifest injustice occurs if this standard requiring a voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent waiver is not met."). If a defendant enters a plea without adequate knowledge 
of the potential penalties to which his plea will subject him, it is not a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary plea. State v. Shook, 144 Idaho 858, 859-60 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Mr. Wagner contends that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
because his counsel provided him with erroneous information during the plea bargaining 
process. For example, according to Mr. Wagner's affidavit, "[m]y Trial Counsel told me 
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my prior criminal record would cause me to lose at trial."5 (R., p.73.) That advice was 
objectively unreasonable, since the Idaho Supreme has limited the scope of 
common scheme or plan evidence to only those cases where "the commission of two or 
more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other." 
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54-55 (2009) (emphasis from original) (quoting 
State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 7 42, 750-51 (1991 ), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991 )).6 The evidence about Mr. Wagner's prior criminal record 
that the State sought to admit was in regard to a offense fourteen years past, which 
occurred in a different state, and which dealt with an unrelated victim. (Supp. R., pp.57-
58.) As such, the two events were not related to each other in a way that the proof of 
one would tend to establish the other, and so, it is precisely the type of propensity 
evidence that the Idaho Supreme Court had held to be inadmissible in Grist. Therefore, 
counsel's advice - that Mr. Wagner take the plea because he would lose at trial based 
on the evidence of his past record - was objectively unreasonable. 
The district court summarily dismissed this claim because it determined that 
Mr. Wagner's prior record was appropriately admitted before the sentencing judge. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.6, L.20 - p.7, L.1; R., p.69.) However, that analysis is irrelevant to 
Mr. Wagner's complaint regarding what trial counsel told him he could expect "at trial." 
5 The record supports Mr. Wagner's allegation in this regard, as it demonstrates that his 
concern - that his prior record could be introduced as evidence at trial - was legitimate. 
The State had filed a motion to allow them to present that evidence to the jury under 
I.R.E. 404(b) as evidence of a common scheme or plan. (Supp. R., pp.56-60.) 
Therefore, Mr. Wagner's allegation - that trial counsel told him that evidence would 
cause him to lose at trial - is an assertion that trial counsel told Mr. Wagner that his 
rrior record would be admitted. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Grist on this point. State v. Joy, 155 
Idaho 1, 9 (2013). 
8 
(R., p.73 (emphasis added). Therefore, the district court's conclusions about the 
propriety of admitting Mr. Wagner's prior sentencing do not justify its decision 
to summarily dismiss Mr. Wagner's petition. 
Mr. Wagner also contended that he was not adequately informed about the 
potential punishments during his consideration of whether to accept the plea deal. 
Specifically, he alleged that "Trial Counsel told me I would be sentenced to life in prison 
if I lost at trial." (R., p.73.) While a life sentence may have been a potential penalty with 
the sentencing enhancement still on the table (see Supp. R., pp.51-52 (the State's 
motion for leave to file information, part 11, based on Mr. Wagner's prior record)), such a 
sentence was not required, and certainly, a mandatory life sentence was not required. 
(See, e.g., Supp. Tr., p.10, Ls.18-20 (the district court informing Mr. Wagner that the 
"maximum possible penalty" was life in prison) (emphasis added).) As such, counsel's 
representation that Mr. Wagner "would be sentenced to life in prison" was erroneous. 
(R., p.73 (emphasis added).) Therefore, Mr. Wagner's allegations demonstrate 
objectively unreasonable performance by trial counsel, which rendered his plea to be 
not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. If Mr. Wagner's allegations are correct, 
considering the facts in the light most favorable to him as the non-moving party, he 
would be entitled to relief. Therefore, his allegations are sufficient to create a genuine 
issue of material fact as to the first prong of the Strickland test. 
Mr. Wagner also alleged that he was prejudiced by counsel's objectively 
unreasonable performance. Besides the manifest injustice and due process violation 
caused by his plea being entered without the necessary voluntariness, see, e.g., 
Heredia, 144 Idaho at 97, Mr. Wagner was also prejudiced because, but for counsel's 
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advice about his potential trial, the potential sentence, and the offered deal, 
would have demanded a jury trial. (R., p.74.) He felt "duped" into pleading guilty. 
(R., p.57.) That allegation establishes a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
errors, Mr. Wagner would not have pleaded guilty when he did, but rather, would have 
insisted on going to trial. Compare Booth, 151 Idaho at 621. That allegation is 
uncontradicted in the record. (See generally R.) Therefore, that allegation in 
Mr. Wagner's affidavit is sufficient for Mr. Wagner's petition to create a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the second prong of the Strickland test. Since he has alleged facts 
demonstrating objectively unreasonable performance and prejudice, Mr. Wagner 
petition created at least one genuine issue of material fact, and, therefore, he was 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing in this matter. 
The fact that there was evidence in the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire 
which potentially contradicted some of Mr. Wagner's allegations does not change the 
conclusion that Mr. Wagner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The Idaho Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that, at the summary dismissal stage of post conviction 
proceedings, the district court is required to not just construe, but liberally construe, all 
the inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See, e.g., Dunlap v. State, 155 Idaho 
345, 361 (2013); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792; Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 321. 
However, "the trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn 
from uncontroverted evidentiary facts." State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008). 
In this case, the district court misapplied this rule. It relied on evidence emerging 
from Mr. Wagner's answers in the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire as the 
uncontroverted evidence from which it could draw reasonable inferences to undermine 
10 
Mr. Wagner's claims. (R., pp.69-71.) However, Mr. Wagner challenged the reliability of 
his answers in the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire by asserting in his affidavit that 
he was trying to give the "correct" (as opposed to the "accurate") answers. (R., pp. 73-
74.) Mr. Wagner alleged that the reason his answers were inaccurate was because, in 
discussing the matter with counsel, counsel told him that if he did not give the "correct" 
answer, his plea would be rejected. (R., p.74.) Therefore, the evidence from the guilty 
plea colloquy and questionnaire was disputed. 
As a result, the district court was not free to draw any inference from that 
evidence; it was required to construe it in the light most favorable to Mr. Wagner. See, 
e.g., Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 361. Furthermore, by using the disputed responses in the 
guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire as a basis to summarily dismiss Mr. Wagner's 
petition, the district court was essentially making a credibility determination that those 
answers were more reliable than Mr. Wagner's statement under oath in his affidavit. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that "judging credibility is not appropriate 
during summary judgment proceedings where no evidentiary hearing has been held." 
Vanderford Co., Inc., v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664,674 (2011). This rule holds true "even 
when the court will serve as trier of fact, credibility determinations 'should not be made 
on summary judgment .... "' Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 
411, 419 (2012) (quoting Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670 (Ct. App. 1984)). 
Therefore, the district court's determination that, since it was the trier of fact, it could 
make those determinations at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings (see 
11 
R., p.71 ), was clearly wrong.7 As a result, its reliance on the contested answers in the 
plea colloquy and questionnaire as a viable 
petition was erroneous and should be reversed. 
summarily dismiss Mr. Wagner's 
Applying the proper standards in this case, it is clear that Mr. Wagner's petition 
sets forth a genuine issue of material fact as to whether trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance as Mr. Wagner decided whether to exercise his constitutional right 
to a jury trial or to accept the pending plea offer, and so, rendered his plea not 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Therefore, the decision to summarily dismiss 
his petition was erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wagner respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order summarily 
dismissing his petition, vacate the final judgment, and remand this case for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this 26th day of September, 2014. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
7 The district court's determination that Mr. Wagner presented no new evidence after 
the district court entered is notice of intent to summarily dismiss the petition is also 
clearly wrong because Mr. Wagner filed an affidavit making new or additional 
allegations in support of his petition, including the allegation that the answers in the plea 
colloquy and questionnaire were not accurate, after the notice of intent was filed. 
(R., pp.64-72 (the notice of intent to summarily dismiss filed on July 31, 2013); 
R., pp.73-74 (Mr. Wagner's affidavit filed on August 19, 2013).) 
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